Tag Archives: Gibbard-Satterthwaite

Any sufficiently rich, non-dictatorial rule system is manipulable. Not some such systems — all of them. The theorem guarantees that there exists some situation in which some agent can do better by acting contrary to the system’s intended purpose. Posts under this tag are about finding those situations, usually in places the rule designers didn’t think to look.

I Would Manipulate It If It Weren’t So Duggan: The Gibbardish of Measurement

Posted on by

A fundamental consideration in decision- and policy-making is aggregation of competing/complementary goals.  For example, consider the current debate about how to measure when the “border is secure” with respect to US immigration reform.  (A nice, though short, piece alluding to these issues is here.)

A recent GAO report discusses the state of border security, the variety of resources employed, and the panoply of challenges associated the the rather succinctly titled policy area known as “border security.”  An even more on-point report was issued in February of this year.

Let’s consider the problem of determining when “the border is secure.”  This is a complicated problem for a lot of reasons, and I will focus on only one here.  Specifically, the question is equivalent to determining the “winners” from a set of potential outcomes.

In particular, there a lot of potential worlds that could follow from (say) a “border surge.”  These worlds are distinguished by measurement, a cornerstone of social science and governance. For example, consider the following three measures of “border security”:

  1. Amount of illegal firearms brought across the border, and
  2. Amount of illegal cocaine brought across the border, and
  3. Number of (new) illegal aliens in the United States.

(Note that there are lot of ways to make this even more interesting, in terms of the strategic incentives of “the act of measurement.”  For example, if you want to believe that the level of illegal firearms brought across the border is low, an arguable way to do this is to stop “looking for firearms.”  But I will leave these incentive problems to the side and focus on the incentive to misreport/massage “sincerely collected” data/measurements. Furthermore, the astute reader will note that I could pull the same rabbit out of the same hat with only two measures.)

Before continuing, note that the selection of these measurements is left to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense) who is called upon in the bill to submit to Congress a `Comprehensive Southern Border Security Strategy,” which “shall specify the priorities that must be met” for the border to be deemed secure. (Sec. 5 of S.744, the immigration bill as passed by the Senate.)

In general, of course, there are multiple ways to indirectly measure—and no direct way to measure—whether the border is “secure,” (i.e., the notion of a “secure border” is one of measurement itself) and these must be aggregated/combined in some fashion to reach a conclusion.

On the one hand, it might seem like this is a simple problem: after all, for all intents and purposes, it is a binary one: the border is secure or it is not. End of story.  AMIRITE?  No, that’s not true.  Because the issue here is that there are three potential programs to choose from.

To see this, suppose that there are three possible programs, plans A, B, and C.

Now, think about how you will/should measure if a program will result in a “secure border.”

The question at hand is how one compares the different programs.  So, to make the problem meaningful, suppose that at least one of the programs will be deemed successful and at least one will be deemed unsuccessful (otherwise the measurement is meaningless).

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite (and, even more accurately, the Duggan-Schwartz) Theorem implies that such a system can/should not guarantee that one elicits truthful reports of the measurements of all dimensions (guns, drugs, illegal aliens) in all situations, even if the measurements are infinitely precise and reliable.

Why is this?  Well, in a nutshell, in order to elicit truthful reports of every dimension of interest (i.e., guns, drugs, and illegal aliens), the system must be increasing in each of these measures.  However, this is at odds with making trade-offs.  In the context of this example, there are programs A and B such that A decreases guns but has no other effect, and B decreases drugs but has no other effect.  In this case, which program do you choose?  Putting a bunch of “reduction” in the black box, one must “eventually” choose between A and B, at least in some situation, because otherwise the measurement of guns-reduction and drugs-reduction become meaningless.

So, suppose that A decreases guns by “a little” but B decreases drugs by “a lot.” How do you compare a handgun to a pound of China White? Choose a ratio, and then imagine, if plan B was just a peppercorn shy of the “cutpoint” in terms of the reduction of drugs relative to the decrease in guns…but (say) A is $100Billion more expensive than B…what would you report about the effectiveness of B?

Well, you’d overreport the effectiveness of B (or underreport the effectiveness of A, possibly). AMIRITE?  The measures are inherently incomparable until you choose how to make them comparable.

So…what does this mean?  Well, first, that governance is hard—and perpetually so.  But, more specifically “mathofpolitics,” it clearly and unquestionably indicate that theory must come before (practical or theoretical) empirics.  In a nutshell: every non-trivial decision system is astonishingly susceptible to measurement issues: even when measurement is not actually a practical problem. For the skeptical among those of still reading, note that I only “played with” elicitation/reporting—I am happy to assume away for the moment the very real and fun issues of practical measurement.

With that, I leave you with this.

 

A Byrd in the Hand, or the 3 R’s of the Senate: Reid, Rules, & Retribution

Posted on by

Forceful confrontation to a threat to filibuster is undoubtedly the antidote to the malady.
–Sen. Robert Byrd (D, WV)

Filibuster reform in the US Senate has once again begun to attract attention.  In a nutshell, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D, NV) is—ahem—upset that—in his opinion, at least—Republican Senators are unreasonably holding up executive branch nominations out of either animus towards the Obama Administration, hostility to the missions of the government agencies in question, or both.  As a result, Reid is contemplating “the nuclear option,” in which the Democrats and Vice President Joe Biden, as President of the Senate, would use the essentially majoritarian character of the Senate’s rules to clarify that the Senate is—particularly when a majority is ticked off—an essentially majoritarian body in which 51 votes wins.

Senate Republicans, who hold a minority of seats, are understandably upset about the possibility of “the bomb being dropped” and are threatening retribution if Reid goes nuclear.  I will not describe the procedural details of the nuclear option, which are easily found for those who, like me, enjoy parliamentary skullduggery. Instead, I will focus on the “mathofpolitics” of Reid’s situation.

Let’s set up the problem in a succinct fashion.  Going nuclear, Reid and the Senate Democrats can at least ensure an up or down on nominees.  While it isn’t clear (feel encouraged to clarify this for/update me in the comments or “offline/online” by emailing me)  exactly how “big” of a nuclear bomb Reid will/can drop in the sense of whether it would guarantee votes on all executive nominations, including judicial, or just those to executive agencies (or some other subset), I’ll keep it simple and just presume it’ll apply to all nominations, but not legislation.

Presumably, being able to get a timely up or down vote on nominations will be good for Reid and the Democrats right now, because President Obama is a Democrat.  So, there’s the easiest argument for why Reid should “go nuclear.”

However, there are at least two frequently forwarded arguments for why Reid should not go nuclear: the “scorched earth” argument and the “uncertain majority” argument.  The scorched earth argument goes as follows: if Reid goes nuclear and ensures votes on nominations, then Senate Republicans will find new ways to halt business, and retaliate by slowing the Senate down even more.  The uncertain majority argument, on the other hand, points out that the Democrats will not hold the majority forever, and their procedural victory will eventually get used against their interests by a subsequent Republican majority. I’ll consider these arguments in turn, and then summarize a “third way” that Reid might go.

As Ezra Klein points out, the scorched earth argument is (arguably, at least right now) less powerful than one might presume.  In a nutshell, this is because one might argue that the Republicans are currently “blocking everything” anyway.  (This is shorthand—as Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R, KY) and others have pointed out, the Senate Republicans are not blocking everything, or even all nominations.)  Accordingly, from a game theoretic perspective, one might argue that this argument should not have much impact on the Democrats’ decision to go nuclear or not.  Indeed, it suggests a rationale for why Reid and the Democrats should at least threaten to go nuclear: if the Republicans recognize that the scorched earth argument does not have much pull on the Democrats, then they will take such a threat more seriously and, to the degree Republicans do not want the nuclear option used, they will have an incentive to offer concessions to avoid its use.  (See the great series of posts essentially about this dynamic by Jonathan Bernstein and Sarah Binder, (here’s Bernstein’s response, and Binder’s response).)

Perhaps as a result of the limitations of the scorched argument in the current stand-off, the uncertain majority argument has been quickly brought forward by Senate Republicans.  Indeed, while the scorched earth argument has been publicly forwarded, too, it has essentially been quickly replaced/backed up by the uncertain majority argument. For this reason, as well as the fact that the excellent exchange between Bernstein & Binder essentially focuses on the likelihood/credibility of the scorched earth response, I will move on to the uncertain majority argument.

First, the uncertain majority argument is not dispositive. (Note that the scorched earth argument, to the degree that the minority can credibly implement it, is potentially dispositive in the sense of its irony: vote to speed things up and instead slow things down.)  This is because a bird in the hand is arguably better than two in the bush.  Reid’s experience with the Senate Republicans may have shown him that there may not even be one “in the bush.”  The real worry here is that, to the degree that Reid and the Democrats are actually tempted by the nuclear option, the GOP will presumably also be tempted by it when it gains the majority.

Let’s think about this for a second.  Thinking about the strategic situation in a little offers some insight into the relevant factors all Senators should be thinking about.

Suppose first that the nuclear option is “popular” in the sense that the public will approve (or at least not disapprove) of its use.  Well, in this case, the majority party should realize that, if they go nuclear, then—ceteris paribus—they are more likely to retain the majority.  More subtly, if we presume that this popularity is likely to hold into the near future, the majority should realize that if the minority party gains the majority in the near future, the new majority party will face a similar situation and, accordingly, the current minority party is likely to go nuclear at that point.  Both scenarios suggest that the Democrats should go nuclear: it would be popular and the minority party would do it if they gain the majority in the future.

So, under what conditions would the nuclear option not be a good choice?  Well, it boils down to two questions:

  1. Would “going nuclear” be unpopular/electorally costly? (Republican Senators are arguing that it would be.  Extra credit: given that we have a two-party system, why should one be at least a little skeptical of this statement?)
  2. If one does not go nuclear now, will “going nuclear” be popular in the future?

The first question is more pressing than the second, if only because of “bird in the hand” reasoning.  I don’t know the answer, and it’s not clear to me that anyone does, because I don’t think voters care, per se, about this procedural move: they want the Senate to “play by the rules” and “get things done” (i.e. the “cake and have it too” syndrome).  What is clear to me, however, is that Reid’s actions will frame the issue and at least partially determine the popularity of “going nuclear.”  I return to this below to conclude the post but, in a nutshell, I think this dimension is what will ultimately prevent the Democrats from going nuclear and, to be clear, I think part of that is Reid’s fault (but maybe by design).

The second question—will going nuclear be popular in the future—is truly secondary for now, but this will potentially be less true in 2016, should the Democrats hold on to the Senate majority in 2014.  This is because President Obama is a Democrat, and the Republicans’ promised uses of a “51-vote Senate” (e.g., read to the end of this) include using “their majority control to jam through a repeal of the Affordable Care Act, a repeal of the Wall Street Reform Act and other GOP priorities.”  Indeed, Sen. Lamar Alexander (R, TN) “said the GOP conference could pass with a simple majority vote legislation to weaken unions, authorization to complete the Keystone XL oil sands pipeline and other items.”

Because neither party controls two-thirds of either chamber, I have a strong suspicion that neither “a repeal of the Affordable Care Act” nor “a repeal of the Wall Street Reform Act” will actually occur before January 2017: I just can’t see President Obama signing such bills (in fact, I kind of doubt that the GOP would pass such bills even if they had the numbers).

So, I think the primary question for Senate Democrats is how electorally costly going nuclear would be.  As I alluded to above, I think going nuclear would give the GOP a useful mobilizer for the 2014 midterm elections.  Right now, the GOP doesn’t have much of “an issue” to run on in my opinion (neither do the Democrats).  “Breaking the rules to ram through executive appointments” particularly against the backdrop of the AP wiretaps/PRISM/IRS/Benghazi scandals (not to mention the for-now-arcane recess appointments dustup), might have a lot of traction with swing voters.

Reid’s actions at this point are key.  For all of the parliamentary Dr. Strangelove’s out there, this is how I would go nuclear if I were Reid.  (I’m not the first by any means to make this argument, but sometimes it’s good to repeat things that seem to make sense.)

Reid should force the GOP to take the floor.  He should essentially set aside the “tracking system” in which the Senate moves from item-to-item in a parallel fashion.  He has said the GOP is being obstructionist.  Instead of trying to invoke cloture on the nomination of (say) Gina McCarthy (currently awaiting confirmation as administrator of the EPA), Reid should bring McCarty’s confirmation up for debate, and not let the Senate move on until a vote is taken.  MAKE THE GOP FILIBUSTER/OBSTRUCT IN PUBLIC. 

In equilibrium, voters should not believe Reid’s claims that the GOP is obstructing business.  We as the electorate could, I suppose, crack open the Congressional Record and try to discern the counterfactuals but (1) that is actually pretty hard to do in a sensible way—if obstruction is unpopular (which it essentially must be if going nuclear will be electorally popular), then obstructionists have an incentive to obfuscate their obstructionism (say that 3 times fast), and (2) as Anthony Downs famously made clear, we not only aren’t going to, it isn’t even clear that it would be rational for us to take the time to do so.  No…if overcoming obstructionism is a big deal, Reid and the Democrats need to sit down and send the costly signal of its importance to the public by (ironically) forcing the GOP to obstruct in a visible fashion.  I don’t think Reid is going to do this, and maybe that’s the right decision, given the facts, but if he doesn’t do this, I don’t think he’ll go nuclear.  Senate rules are kind of like an A-Team episode: sure, there’s a lot of fights, but nobody ever dies.

With that, I continue a theme and leave you with this.

 

Political Issues are Like Cookies

Posted on by

The debate about gun control provides a great example of a collision between political issues and public policies. As I describe more below, most “political issues” are labels/shortcuts for describing preferences about multiple specific government policies/laws. The point of this post is that gun control, a political issue, is like a cookie.  How I feel about cookies is not necessarily well-linked with how I feel about the various ingredients in a cookie. For example, I am strongly “pro-cookie.” However, while I am “pro” butter, eggs, and chocolate, I am strongly opposed to vanilla extract, baking soda, and flour.

This culinary digression is actually illustrative of an important point for those who are upset following yesterday’s vote on the Manchin-Toomey background checks amendment.  In particular, while I have already argued that the vote is not necessarily indicative of a failure of democratic institutions,* the point I want to make, and the “math of politics”of this post, is that political issues represent convenient and way to discuss attitudes and goals, but they are very rarely neatly mapped onto, and generally subsume multiple, public policies.

Another way to think of it is that many (but not all) political issues collapse various public policies into something like a “less strict/more strict” dimension.  “Gun control,” “environmental regulation,” and “consumer safety” are each examples of this.

People can respond very differently to the policies that compose a political issue than they do to the issue itself.  Sometimes in paradoxical ways.

The implications of this for the gun control debate are clearly illustrated by first considering the various questions and poll results about public policies in this Pew survey:

Support for Various Gun Policies

And then considering the more general “bundled” question about the political issue reported in this AP-GfK poll.  This poll (conducted this week) asked just over 1000 Americans “Should gun laws in the United States be made more strict, less strict or remain as they are?”  In response to this deceptively straightforward question,

  • 49% responded “be made more strict,”
  • 38% responded “remain as they are,” and
  • 10% responded “be made less strict.”

(You can find a very convenient tally of similar polls here.)  To be clear and slightly provocative, this kind of public support actually makes the Senate look a little aggressive on gun control: 54 Senators out of 100 voted in favor of the Manchin-Toomey background checks amendment (really 55, counting Reid’s “procedural nay” vote as a “yea”).

This is one basis of what social scientists refer to as “framing.”  Incumbents end up running against strategic challengers, and issues like gun control are a potential nightmare.  Accepting for the sake of argument that there is and will remain overwhelming public support for expanded background checks, every Senator cast a tough vote yesterday. (Hell, Reid cast TWO tough votes—ask John Kerry how to explain this kind of thing.  Oh wait, don’t.)  In the words of challengers-to-be, each Senator was either “against expanded background checks” or “for stricter gun laws,” neither of which is a clear electoral winner.  On the other hand, in the words of every Senator-about-to-seek-reelection, he or she was either “for expanded background checks” or “protecting gun rights,” both of which have pretty strong public support, especially on a state-by-state basis (as this excellent Monkey Cage post makes very clear).

As a final (non-strategic) “math of politics” point, before one thinks that this tension between public support on a given issue and public support for the issue’s constituent policies challenges democratic competence, note that this is all easily understood as an implication of Arrow’s theorem or an instantiation of the referendum paradox or the Ostrogorski paradox.

Yeah, I mentioned Arrow’s Theorem again, so I leave you with this.

_________________________________________________________

* Relatedly, I most fervently disagree with the argument that the Senate is antidemocratic. The Senate is explicitly not designed to deliver “one-person-one-vote” representation.  Furthermore, the founders really meant it.  But I’ve been told that political behavior has far broader appeal than political institutions.

Gresham’s Law in the Senate: How Filibuster Reform Begot Rand Paul’s Filibuster

Posted on by

Bad money drives out good. – Gresham’s Law

Gresham’s law was coined (hahaha!) back when it was apparently okay to call things laws based on a hunch.  Nonetheless, it has a solid theoretical foundation.  To understand it, just consider how you would pay for things if gold and lead were both made legal tender at the same price per pound (hint: you wouldn’t be smart to pay gold for anything).

I bring up Gresham’s law because today’s filibuster by Rand Paul—still ongoing as I write of this—highlights a similar phenomenon that has emerged recently in the Senate.  During the first two months of the 113th Congress, there have already been filibusters of presidential nominations (2 cabinet-level (Hagel & Brennan), one judicial (Halligan), and this phenomenon is directly, and presumably ironically, tied to the filibuster reforms agreed to in January.

In a nutshell, these reforms eliminated or limited the ability to filibuster some (arguably redundant) procedural steps, sped up cloture, and created a few explicitly bipartisan maneuvers that can be used to thwart holds on legislation (thus making it easier for the Majority and Minority Leaders to work together so as to actually begin debate on a bill).

The details of these changes are beyond the scope of tonight’s post.  The point/analogy I want to make can be summarized in two steps.

  1. Filibusters are often about a Senator or group of Senators seeking attention, where “attention” can take many forms: the opportunity to offer amendments, policy or patronage concessions from the President, etc. Accordingly, and particularly if the attention is rather parochial or not on the legislative agenda (as in the case of stonewalling by the White House in the face of requests for clarification about when the President can have drones kill people on American soil), it is often either strategically optimal or logically necessary to filibuster something that is unrelated to the content of the attention that the Senator(s) seek.

  2. The rules changes adopted in January explicitly exempt Cabinet-level and judicial nominations.  Without belaboring the point, the clear goal of the filibuster reform package was to increase the individual cost of filibustering, but it did not do so uniformly.  In other words, while the individual costs of filibustering other matters have increased following the reforms, the cost of filibustering Cabinet-level and judicial nominations is still the same..

Combining these two points: the “currency” of a Senator seeking attention is fundamentally that most precious of all commodities: time. Even in the Senate, where a day is often not a day, an hour is an hour is an hour.  However, the filibuster reforms made some, but not all hours of Senate time more expensive than others for a Senator upset about drone strikes and White House stonewalling.  Tonight, Rand Paul is simply using the cheap coin rather than the expensive one: quite fitting for one who is presumably dubious of bimetallism.

And, speaking of “bad coin,” I leave you with this.