Tag Archives: Legislative Politics

Congress, parliamentary procedure, filibusters, discharge petitions, continuing resolutions, debt ceilings, party discipline, and the many ways formal rules shape — and are shaped by — strategic behavior.

Why a Clean CR is A No Boehner

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Before getting into today’s post, I wanted to point out this excellent post about the discharge petition by Sarah Binder.  I was both embarrassed and relieved when I read it, because it predates and more eloquently states what I did about the practical difficulties with using the discharge petition.  Sarah knows her stuff so, as I explained to my daughter last night, I was sorry to have not read it before posting, but proud to have been thinking the same way.  (Sarah also describes the observed historical difficulty of this procedure in this post.) Credit paid where it is due, I’ll now turn away from the procedures for a second and focus on the floor.

Specifically, I was to consider the math behind the problem that Speaker John Boehner faces.  For simplicity, let’s presume Boehner that would like to move past the shutdown and would be perfectly happy with a “clean CR” that extends appropriations at the (sequestered) levels.[1] For a little over a week at least, Democrats have supported a “clean CR.” Recently, Boehner and Majority Leader Cantor have responded that such a measure would not pass the House.  Democrats have challenged them to try it, noting (somewhat disingenuously, as I’ll get to below) that, if Boehner and Cantor are right, then there’s no harm in trying. Right?

 

Wrong, for at least three reasons. First, many reasonably argue (e.g., David Karol) that the majority party collectively prefers to appear united, a presumption that is given some credit by the much ballyhooed “Hastert Rule.”[2]

The second reason is the one I will focus on first: uncertainty.  This explanation applies to why Boehner didn’t allow a vote on a clean CR prior to the shutdown.  In a nutshell, many members of both parties face a highly uncertain electorate in the following sense.  A vote on a clean CR represents trading-off two “goods” or, put another, choosing the lesser of two evils.  For the stereotypical “moderate” Republican, these are[3]

  1. Responsibly funding the government, or
  2. Modifying the Affordable Care Act.

A public “yea” vote on a clean CR—particularly given the presumption that the ultimate vote will be close—is a costly and visible signal that the member thinks (1) is more important than (2).  This public signal is, of course, a coarse one.  There is no nuance in a clean CR.  So, in order for a reelection-minded member to see a vote on a clean CR as desirable, he or she must know ex ante what vote he or she would like to cast.  I’ll simply assert that few members of the House are very certain about this—this is why whip counts like this one and this one are occupying our attention right now.

The third explanation for why a vote on a clean CR would be “bad for Boehner” applies only after he has taken the public stance that a clean CR would not pass.[5]  While many have argued that Boehner is in a pickle because bringing up a clean CR might lead to a revolt within the GOP and possible his removal as Speaker. I understand this argument, but I don’t think it’s nearly as potent as some others do, mostly because a replacement for Boehner must secure a majority of votes in the House.[6]  Rather, consider the following simplistic story: presume that Boehner wants to be seen as an effective leader with control of his caucus.  Accordingly, he doesn’t want to expose his members to pointless and electorally difficult-to-explain votes.  This is what distinguishes this from the multiple times the House has voted on the pointless measures to repeal the Affordable Care Act—these votes were not difficult for most, if not all, GOP members to explain to their base constituents.

So, what would Boehner gain from allowing a vote on a clean CR?  Well, if the clean CR passes, Boehner and Cantor look disingenuous, inept, and/or out-of-touch with their copartisans.  If the clean CR fails, then Boehner has exposed his members to a difficult-to-explain and pointless vote.  (And, to be even more common-sense about this, he would have let the Democrats (appear to) dictate the agenda of the House.)

Once you add into the mix the residual uncertainty about the debt ceiling, I think it’s a “no brainer” that Boehner and the GOP membership in the House stand a lot to lose in both perception and electoral terms from allowing a vote on a clean CR.  This logic further amplifies the point I made in my previous post about the importance of the Democrats finding something to “lose” in pursuit of an end to this mess.

With that, I leave you with this.

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[1] Remember the sequester…the fiscal cliff?  We were all older then…we’re much younger now.

[2] It is not infrequently brought up, but note that my explanation is arguably more consistent with the history of Boehner’s leadership, because he has violated the Hastert rule on several high-profile votes.

[3] For a stereotypical Democrat, these are

  1. Responsibly funding the government, or
  2. Fighting to undo the effects of the sequester.

[4] Or a “sincere delegate” seeking to faithfully represent some notion of his or her constituents’ interests.  I know, I know…but it’s possible.

[5] Arguably, it also applied with a slightly more circuitous reasoning as soon as the House passed the first “CR with strings” a couple of weeks ago.  But, I’ll leave that for another day.  Perhaps sadly, I expect I’ll have a chance to write about this in about 9 days, if Treasury Secretary Lew’s estimates are right.

[6] Unlike the Majority Leader position and other caucus/conference leadership position, the Speakership isn’t controlled by the majority party.  Accordingly, the Democrats can protect Boehner simply by voting “against his removal,” (they need not vote for Boehner), presuming that some GOP members would stand with Boehner.

Why The House Can’t Discharge Its Duties

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[Edit 10/5/13. Note: When I wrote this, I had not yet read this piece in the Washington Post, which refers to this bill. This doesn’t change the basic math of the post and, indeed, makes its points arguably even more tangible.]

A few people (fewer than I would have expected) have mentioned the possibility of the discharge petition as way to circumvent the House leadership in pursuit of a “clean CR.”  I will briefly describe this procedure and why it wouldn’t work, even procedurally, for the current dilemma.  (For those interested in more details, see my 2007 article “The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics,” the ungated version of which is here.)

Essentially every bill considered by the House of Representatives is first considered by one or more standing committees.  While committees are generally thought of as places where bills might be more closely considered and amendments proposed for eventual consideration by the floor, they also represent opportunities for “gatekeeping,” or negative agenda control, insofar as the committee(s) in question can delay or potentially block floor consideration (and, hence, passage) of the bills referred to them. The discharge petition is a tool that allows a majority of the House to remove (“discharge”) the committee from its responsibility for/ownership of a bill.

The basics of a discharge petition are as follows:[1]

  1. A bill is referred to a committee.
  2. The committee does not report the bill to the floor within 30 days.
  3. A member starts a discharge petition to remove the committee from consideration of the bill.
  4. The petition is signed by a majority of the House (218 members).
  5. The petition is called up when it is privileged (2nd and 4th Mondays of the month)
  6. The motion to discharge is approved by majority vote.
  7. The bill is then considered under the standing rules (open rule)
  8. The bill (possibly as amended) must then receive a majority vote to pass.

This is quite a hill to climb, for many reasons.  For the purpose of this post, I simply want to point out that, as far as I can tell, no “clean CR” has been referred to a committee in the House.[2]  Thus, a member would need to introduce such a CR and have it referred to a committee, and then wait 38 days at least (November 11, 2013). That assumes the member can get 218 signatures.[3]

More to the point, even if a clean CR has been sitting in some committee for 30 days or more, the earliest that such a CR could practically be brought up is October 12th 14th (the second Monday of October).  Given that the GOP has shown unity on procedural maneuvers (such as the previous question on a special rule) during this SHUTDOWN SHOWDOWN, I have a hard time imagining that even this would work.  After all, in 1993, the discharge petition was successfully used…to make signatures on discharge petitions public.[4]  Thus, every GOP member who signed it would be “out in the open” for potentially several days or weeks.

So, in a nutshell, the discharge petition is a potential route to circumventing the leadership, but it definitely ain’t an easy one.  But, you know, should we really be surprised?

With that, I leave you with this.

________________________________

[1] I dispense here with some variations on the route to discharge, including special rules and multiple referrals.  There are some interesting differences for special rules, but discharge of a special rule for consideration of a bill can take no less (and, generally, more) time than a “straight discharge.” The virtue of discharging a special rule is that this route to discharge allows one to discharge a committee and then consider the bill under a “closed rule,” protecting it from amendment.  This is arguably irrelevant in this case, since the Senate has already passed a clean CR, and this would arguably be the object of the discharge.

[2] The closest thing I could find currently in committee in the House is H.J.Res. 62, which is a CR that permanently defunds the Affordable Care Act.  Using this measure to achieve a clean CR would require the use of the special rule route to discharge, mentioned in note [1].  The time problem remains even if this route were used.

[3] …And that the Speaker has not read my article about a subterfuge that would at least theoretically circumvent the whole thing. Really, it’s quite cool.  You know, if you’re into stuff like that. It also can probably be pulled at most one time, after which the rules would be changed.

[4] To see the four currently pending discharge petitions, click here and scroll to the bottom.

Winning At All Costs Will Make Winning Costlier (Than It Needs To Be)

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So, the shutdown continues.  Indeed, it seems to me that the collective conscience has accepted that the shutdown will continue until mid-October, when we can get a “two-for-one” CR-Debt Ceiling deal.  Kind of makes sense, in a sad way.

Anyway, the topic of today’s post is the uncomfortable position of Speaker John Boehner, who may very well want a clean CR. Or, more to the point, he might have truly wanted such an outcome before the shutdown.  There is at least a partial narrative to the effect that a clean CR would not pass.  The storyline is, as I alluded to in the previous post, is one of “ends against the middle,” in which liberal Dems want a “clean plus” CR that restores funding to the pre-sequestration levels[1] vote with tea-party GOP members who prefer people eating the goo out of each other’s heads to anything that might be seen as conferring legitimacy on collective governance.[2]

So, how to resolve this?

Well, I definitely don’t know for sure.  But I think the problem right now—to the degree that one thinks that the proper and properly lexicographic priority is to open the government—is entirely due to the Democrats’ stance on the CR.

Let’s be quick about this.  There is no discussion of what one might call a “CR minus,” which would (for example) fund the government at (say) 95% of the last FY’s levels.[3]

So, what Boehner needs here is a way out while saving face.  That’s basically what he is pleading for with respect to the debt ceiling. To me, Boehner is basically (and reasonably) saying “I’ll get the votes however I can, including from Dems…but I need to look like I got something out of this.”  It is important to note that, in politics, hypothetical wins and losses can count as much (if not more than) observed ones.

From a game-theoretic perspective, Boehner’s leadership struggle (as well as the reelection struggles of his more moderate copartisans) is based on the suspicion that he is not a sufficiently “true conservative.”  In signaling game terminology, Boehner needs some meaningful (“costly”) way to differentiate (“separate”) himself from Obama.

A side note: this argument can be related directly to the normal practice (at least in the US) of the winner of an election deferring his or her victory speech until the loser gives his or her concession speech, often preceded by a publicly announced “phone call” from the loser to the victor congratulating him or her on the victory and “a contest well fought.”

Here’s the deal: Obama (and arguably Pelosi) each have the opportunity to go VERY public and demand the moon.  Overplay the hand—demand not only a clean CR, but—-I dunno—a tax increase on the rich.  Let every Democrat who wishes to do so go public and disown this position as too extreme.  Then, have Obama/Pelosi sit down with Boehner and Cantor at the local Applebee’s, and come out with Pelosi and Obama mad as hell.  They need to say that Boehner won’t budge, won’t give into the strengths of their positions.  Maybe get Howard Dean to come up and give a “HEEEE-YAAHHH” for full effect.

Then Boehner takes the stage and says, look, this isn’t the thing we as good conservatives wanted here, but I think it’s time for us to come together and get to the real business of this nation.[4]  He turns and welcomes Reid, McConnell, and a few other Democrats and Republicans to the stage.  The Rules Committee brings the clean CR passed by the Senate to the floor with a closed rule, Boehner walks out smelling like roses with a solid 330-100 or so vote, and *POOF* the tea party is arguably neutered.

It has been said that the real value of the right to appeal in judicial systems is as a way for losers to “save face.” I really believe this.  Almost every collective decision has at least two components: the policy impact of the actual choice, and the reputational impacts on those who argued for and against the choice during the deliberations.  Incentivizing “fair dealing” sometimes requires the (policy) winners to “take a hit” on the reputational front.[5]

It would be sad and truly ironic if the Democrats take the “evidence” (at least strong folk belief) that the GOP overplayed its hand in 1995-96 so closely to heart that they end up overplaying their own hands in this one.

With that, I leave you with this.

______________

[1] Sorry to bring it up again, but remember sequestration?  Man, those were crazy times.  Like when we opened the fire exit for those dudes bringing burgers back from Hardees and almost didn’t get to walk in graduation!  Except, now it’s like, they got cold hot dogs from 7-11 and we ate them while watching Full House reruns.

[2] Too strong?  Oh, I don’t think so.

[3] The piecemeal approach being pursued by Boehner is an intriguing one, but I’ll leave that for later.  For now, I’ll simply say that such a strategy smacks of “politics meets the need to be seen as active meets the desire of Members of Congress to have their trash picked up.”  Or, more simply, “panic politics.”

[4] Which is, of course, Reality TV.

[5] Note that, in classical two-party electoral competition, “taking a hit” and “declining to pounce on an opportunity to win” are equivalent.

SHUTDOWN: The Inherent Tension Between Responsive & Responsible Governing

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The US federal government is currently “closed” because the Democratic and Republican parties cannot agree to what seems to be a Pareto optimal (i.e., unanimously preferred) policy (namely, the government being “open”).

I will dispense with current events and turn immediately to the question of “why?”  This shutdown is arguably different than the most recent (1995-96) one.  In the previous shutdown, a Republican controlled Congress attached policy prescriptions to measures keeping the government open (known as continuing resolutions, or “CRs”).

That sounds similar to this situation…but remember, in 1995 the GOP had not controlled both chambers of Congress for FORTY YEARS.  (Interestingly, Bill Clinton was arguably slightly more popular (in terms of job approval margin) when he faced the shutdown than Barack Obama is now.)  So, in a sense, the stance they took could be argued to be “a new one” with respect to the status quo policies.

Now, of course, the GOP’s focus is on a policy that has most definitely been debated and redebated repeatedly over the past 3 years: health care.

So, why the impasse?  Well, in game theory, there’s a classic result (really, family of results) known as the “folk theorem.”  This result states that cooperative (Pareto optimal) outcomes can be sustained, even in spite of players’ short-run incentives to shirk/defect/fight, so long as the players expect the game to “continue for long enough.”[1]

The basic (very loose) intuition behind the folk theorem is that, if two players are facing each other in the same game repeatedly (i.e., “for long enough”), “defecting/selfish play” by one player can lead to “defecting/selfish play” by the other in future periods/iterations of the game.  Thus, this specter of punishment of today’s poor behavior deters such behavior in pursuit of higher sustained cooperative payoffs in future iterations of the game. The political salience of this possibility in the present conflagration is brought out by this article. In a nutshell, Speaker Boehner arguably might worry that effecting a compromise will lead to his ouster as Speaker of the House. But this leads to the question of why members of either party would risk overturning normal order and replacing a Speaker for enabling a seemingly obvious, common-sense, and efficient (if stop-gap) compromise.

A key feature of today’s electoral environment—especially for members representing “tea party” (i.e., very conservative) and “tree hugger” (i.e., very liberal) districts—is a high level of uncertainty—not about the general election, but the primary election.  In particular, the internal politics of both parties, combined with both demographic (immigration/aging) and technological (facebook/cell phones/twitter) changes has arguably made things like microtargeting possible and highly potent in terms of mounting a “challenge from the extremes” in primary elections—especially in ideologically homogeneous districts.

In some ways, such changes are “good”: to the degree that voters’ wishes should be respected, these changes potentially reduce the stagnation attributed historically to regularities such as the “incumbency advantage.”

On the other hand, such changes arguably increase the incentive for (reelection-seeking) members to “dig their heels in” as a bulwark against potential challengers from the extreme of their in the upcoming election.  To think about this concretely for a second, note that both Democrats and Republicans have been against a “clean CR” (one that would simply extend funding at the present (sequestered) levels.[2]

I will not delve into the details of this opposition too much, but simply consider this vote and this vote—in both, the extreme liberals and conservatives of the House essentially voted “in protest” of what was about to happen.  This “(ideological) ends against the (ideological) middle” type of conflict is rare in Congress.  That’s because, from a simple “yea/nay vote on a bill” perspective, it doesn’t really make sense: one of the “ends” should be happy about the (either left or right) direction embodied in the bill in question.

But here—the conflict is not about the policy, it’s about the appearance of supporting the policy as opposed to a hypothetical counterfactual.  The liberals against a clean CR (at least early on) wanted to make it clear that they favored expanding funding back to the pre-sequestration levels.  The conservatives against a clean CR wanted to make it clear that they were against Obama the Affordable Care Act.

So, in this situation, as in all good social science: there’s a pro, a con, and a lot of gray.[3]

On the one hand, members are arguably very attentive to their constituents. YAY!

On the other hand, members are unsure about how constituents will interpret their actions. BOO!

The gray area comes about because, it is not clear to me that the voters are actually clear on what THEY want either.  The Affordable Care Act polls very badly.  I doubt that it will do so in five years. But, to be fair, this is a democracy.  The question, then, is do we want Congress to make long-lived policy choices based on what “we want them to do now,” or on what “we, looking back in 20 years, will want them to have done now”?

That’s paternalism, of course, though arguably in a slightly subtle guise.  But, if you say you’ve never worried about your short-term impulses and tried to constrain yourself, then I say, you should. When you “worry about short-term behavior,” this is equivalent to worrying about the impact of revisiting/second-guessing “normal” decisions on a regular basis.

The problem in this situation, then, is that we are (at least in certain districts, and arguably everywhere but to different extents) an electorate that allows itself to constantly reconsider “what has my representative done for me lately?”  Keeping your representative “responsive” can provide strong incentives to pander and/or “act tough/sincere/ideologically pure.”

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Notes.

[1] Folk theorems rely on something known as “the discount parameter,” which indicates how much one values “rewards received tomorrow” relative to “rewards today.”  In other words, a higher discount factor means one is more patient. The interpretation of the discount parameter in practice is a bit ambiguous, but one positive determinant of its value in this context is the likelihood that the player in question will be involved in the interaction in question (i.e., policymaking) again in the future.  Thus, higher certainty of reelection for any GOP member of the House implies that this member’s discount parameter should be higher, ceteris paribus.

[2] Remember the sequester?  Remember the fiscal cliff?  Ahh, we were so innocent. Turns out that was just a “fiscal step.”

[3] In much good social science, there’s also a con man.

Putting the “Come At Me, Bro” in “Comity” or, Boehner is a Painer to McConnell

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So, as you might very well have read (and probably predicted): the House has attempted to present President Obama with the facile Faustian bargain of averting government shutdown by agreeing to repeal the Affordability Care Act (ACA, or “Obamacare”).

I have ideas about how this is even more absolutely ridiculous (from a strategic perspective) for the House GOP than it might appear.  But those are even less interesting than what I am going to write about.  (And to be clear, GOP leaders—including the Chair of the Appropriations Committee, Harold Rogers (R-Ky)—are publicly clear about the fact that this is a ridiculous gambit.)

Quickly, because we all have fantasy football lineups to pore over for hours prior to leaving them just as they were (i.e., FFB Fiduciary Diligence), let me ask—has anyone asked Mitch McConnell, the Senate Minority Leader, how much he is hating his life right now?  (I presume that McConnell is in favor of removing the ACA defunding language, though it seems like he might not yet have said as much. The linked blog also sketches out a neat (and obvious upon reflection) trick that I hadn’t thought about Reid using to strip the language.)

In addition to the fact that the House GOP’s tactic will not win any extra votes (and probably lose a few), McConnell has to choose exactly how he wants to “plate” a simmering pile of turd in the Senate.  There are two basic scenarios, depending on whether the Senate takes up the House’s version of the continuing resolution (CR).  The two are actually the same, except in terms of labeling. And while labeling can/does matter in politics, I will get to the point.

Reid wants to present to the Senate for a final vote a version of the CR that is free of the ACA-defunding language.  Regardless of how Reid tries to get there (either through a new CR, a pre-cloture amendment to the existing CR, or—as the above link highlights—securing cloture prior to offering such an amendment), a determined coalition of 41 Senators can stymie his efforts.  The GOP currently holds 46 seats so, without McConnell’s cloakroom help, Reid would need (at least) 6 Republicans to visibly cross lines and support Reid (cloture votes must be recorded).

Presuming that this won’t happen (or that McConnell would prefer that it not happen for other reasons), McConnell must somehow get his Senators to not filibuster the new version of the CR.  Ugh.

Note that Boehner has many more tools at his disposal—let’s call them “the Rules Committee and their precious panoply of procedural ploys”—to save face while sending a relatively clean CR to the Senate so as to keep the government from shutting down.

Also, note that—as far as I can tell—this is all still separate from the debt ceiling showdown.  With that, I leave you with this.

No War Left Behind?

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When President Obama requested Congressional authorization for military intervention in Syria, he not only “scored one for the Constitution,” he also—not coincidentally—scored one for his party.

First of all, he provided an opportunity for the GOP to lay bare the division within their ranks: on this dimension, there are effectively “I hate Obama, so I vote `no'” and “We need to be an effective superpower and project our rightly garnered might wherever the executive sees fit” camps.

Second, and more provocatively, he also drummed up a prologue to the forthcoming budget fight(s) between him and Congress.  In short, the GOP can either say “no” to intervention in Syria (and hence have the blood of whatever comes from that tragic crisis at least putatively on its collective hands), or the GOP can authorize something that it then must try—if it plays hardball with budgetary/debt ceiling recalcitrance—to explain why it won’t fund.  I have a hard time seeing either one being palatable to the GOP, much less in tandem.

The sad part of this, of course, is that it centers on the lives and dreams of people far away, who get no vote in how it could ever be settled.  Nonetheless, these are the times we live in: work for what you think is right, and pray that the chips fall on the side you support.

With that, I leave you with this.

A Whip Applied Twice Is Half A Whip

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Politico is reporting that Pelosi has sent a fifth letter urging House Democrats to support authorization for military intervention in Syria:

“Pelosi, who says she won’t whip Syria vote, sends fifth letter in a week to colleagues…”

The tweet suggests—to me at least—that the repeated (public) calls to support authorization for military intervention in Syria amounts to whipping, even if not in name.  I write briefly to suggest that this is exactly the wrong inference to be drawn.

To cut to the chase, the notion of a whip in legislative politics is that of party pressure: of exercise of a command-and-control mechanism from party leadership on party rank-and-file: to “get in line,” as it were, on a given matter.

What is special about whipping is that it is not good old-fashioned lobbying: it is supposedly more impressive and effective precisely because it works.  We might disagree about why, but whipping is different than simple lobbying because it is based on partisan-caucus membership, as opposed to “good old fashioned pressure/persuasion.”

This picture is, in classically mysterious terms, enforced/sustained only by the use of it being quite nonobvious.  Parents among us will understand the importance of this feature when you think about expressions like “oh, when Dad used to get that look in his eye…,” “I did it because I knew Mom liked it done that way,” or—most fittingly—“oh, you never heard Mom/Dad say it twice.”

Here, “the parent,” Nancy Pelosi, has said it publicly five times.  At some level, people might say—well, clearly she wants to have the effect of whipping the vote while saying she isn’t.  Really?  To believe this is to equate whipping the vote with getting the votes.  That’s like saying Peyton Manning didn’t care if he threw 7 TDs or had Ronnie Hillman run 3 TDs in, 2 TDs come from Danny Trevathan interceptions (okay, maybe too soon), and have the NFL grant him 14 legacy points.

NO.  PEYTON. CARES.

Almost every leader cares not only about outcome, but also about the perception of how that outcome was achieved.  (See: why did Saddam Hussein—quite nonuniquely—hold elections that he was sure to win?)

If Pelosi was going to whip this, there’s no fifth letter.  Hell, there’s no first letter.  She’d simply remark in an off-the-cuff way, “the President will receive the support his request deserves from the House Democratic Caucus,” and that would be it.

Some have said—quite plausibly—that Pelosi can’t whip the vote even if she wanted to.  Maybe.  In fact, I think that’s probably right.  But, as my previous post elucidated, it’s not clear she wants to.  And, at this point in her career, I don’t think she has much to work for except her legacy and/or what she thinks is right.  Is intervention in Syria right?  I definitely don’t know.  But I do know that, in all likelihood, she wasn’t just randomly choosing whether and when to write public letters to her colleagues over the past couple of days.  She’s the freaking Minority Leader in the House.  This ain’t her first rodeo.

Of course, there’s a good story—in addition to, and not contradictory to, mine—about why she might not whip her caucus than “she doesn’t have the juice.”  In a nutshell: this story is called, “Hey Johnny B., how you like this upside-down version of Article I, Section 7?”

And with that, I leave you with this.

If You Whip Me, The Voters Will Whup Me

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Quoting Politico …

“[House Minority Leader Nancy] Pelosi said Wednesday at an event in San Francisco she does not plan to whip a Syria resolution when it comes to the House floor…”

Leaving aside the moral and strategic questions about the advisability of striking Syria (far beyond my competence), the dynamic unfolding here is intriguig from a Math of Politics standpoint.  Why would Pelosi not whip Democrats to support a president of their party to support an item of the highest profile that he has requested?

There are plenty of ready-made (and randomly-ordered) solutions: (a) Pelosi doesn’t have “the juice” to deliver and wants to cover for the potential of failure, (b) a win for the authorization measure would be at best a wash in terms of political gain for Democrats, given the divided control of Congress, (c) Pelosi is more dove than hawk, or even (d) Obama might prefer to “blame shift” nonaction onto Congress (slash potentially accentuate his own foreseen presidential unilateral action in Syria).

These are all quite viable, but—with the exception of (d)—fairly first-order.  That is, they don’t look at the bigger picture.  Very quickly, let me introduce a fifth option, (e).

(e) Democrats who vote in favor of authorizing military action in Syria would prefer—for reelection purposes—to be seen as doing so sans party pressure as far as possible.

Here’s the quick model: a moderate voter in 2014 is considering whether to vote D or R.  They have a D incumbent and are essentially choosing whether to take the “known” commodity or vote for a relatively unknown replacement from the other party.  Regardless of the voter’s position vis-a-vis military intervention in Syria, this voter (by the presumption that he or she is moderate) would prefer to reelect an incumbent whose preferences are aligned with her own and would be capable of acting on them in times of (electoral) uncertainty.

It seems, at this point, that Americans are not clearly for or against military intervention in Syria. Timing and question wording each make survey responses mover “too much” for anyone to be sure about how a vote in favor of any resolution that authorizes military action will be ultimately interpreted by “the decisive voter” in 2014 in most districts.  (Think Iraq and Afghanistan, and then think Egypt and then think Libya, and then think Rwanda.  And then, seriously, take a moment to both hug those you love and pray for everyone in Syria and elsewhere.)

So, back to the First World Problems of Congressmen (this piece from The Onion is, as usual, apropos and adroit), let’s consider the inference that a voter would make about his or her representative upon seeing a vote for military action after observing/believing that there was party pressure (“whipping”) to conjure/cajole such votes:

“My incumbent might or might not support military action.  Conversely he or she might be predisposed to follow the party line, because his or her vote might be the result of party pressure.”

On the other hand, if there is no party pressure, [1] the voter would infer

“My incumbent was subject to no party pressure.  Accordingly, I treat his or her vote as a relatively uncontaminated signal of his or her position on [whatever the voter thinks the Syria vote represents].”

The second scenario is obviously more transparent and, accordingly, (perhaps naively) normatively appealing.  But it is strategically riskier for the incumbents.  Why would Pelosi do it, rather than providing cover for the incumbents, as is the normal presumption about the optimal approach for electorally secure leaders with respect to tough votes?

Well, I think a key point here is that many Democrats in the House are in “safe districts,” where their greatest “net electoral threat” based on their vote(s) on Syria comes from the left (i.e., in the primary).  Accordingly, voting in favor of military action in Syria is actually easier for incumbents if there is no party pressure: self-described “liberals” distrust Obama (and presumably, Pelosi if she trotted out a whip to support Obama) on Syria. In a somewhat surprising sense, Pelosi applying no party pressure to Democrats may make it easier/more likely for Obama to secure votes from House Democrats than if she went public (or didn’t deny) that the party apparatus was whipping votes to support the President.

I thought this would be short: in my mind, the model is quite stripped down…sparse even. But context matters…and with that, I leave you with this.

___________________________

[1] I will not go into the signaling/auditing game that follows from thinking about Pelosi’s incentives with respect to whether to truthfully announce her intention to whip.  That’s also very interesting, but much more complicated.  And, hey, this is just a blog.  At some point, we all have to be sincere or at least presume that everybody else is. #Godel

Want It Now? Oh, We’ll Give It To You…Later

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Did the Senate ironically kill (for the time being) an immigration deal by passing an immigration bill?  Arguably, yes.

Control of the Senate is up in the air in the 2014 elections. On the other hand, the GOP seems pretty likely to maintain its majority in the House. If the GOP wins control of the Senate and holds onto the House majority in 2014, then the GOP can control the finer points of an immigration bill in the 114th Congress.  The only practical impediments standing in the way of enacting the bill would be

  1. A filibuster by Democrats in the Senate and
  2. A veto by President Obama.

President Obama has come out strongly in favor of immigration reform, so let’s set that aside. The more interesting angle is the first one.  I wrote recently about the nuclear option, though it seems like we’re now at no worse than Defcon 2. Clearly, if the nuclear option is pulled in its strongest form and legislative filibusters are effectively neutered, then (1) would no longer present an impediment.  So, let’s presume that “the button” is not pushed.

It seems incredibly unlikely that the GOP will hold 60 seats in the Senate in 2015, so the Democrats could stand together and block an immigration bill that they “did not like.”  But, is this likely now?

I argue no, for two reasons.  First, every Democratic Senator voted in favor of S. 744, the Senate’s immigration bill. For some, this was a tough vote, at least in electoral terms.  Thus, these Democrats have already sent a high profile and potentially costly signal that immigration reform is “important” and (this is important) for the Senators who viewed it as “a tough vote,” the sensible implication is that they want their skeptical constituents to believe that immigration reform is important for policy reasons (not partisan ones).

Accordingly, imagine that the GOP presents these Democratic Senators with a modified immigration bill, similar in many respects to S. 744.  Voting against, not to mention pursuing what might end up being high profile efforts to block, such a bill would be arguably seen as partisan obstructionism.  To be succinct, such efforts are not typically viewed favorably by exactly those voters who were/are skeptical of a Democratic incumbent: these are voters who tend to vote Republican but presumably might give a Democrat the benefit of the doubt if the incumbent is perceived to be competent, faithful to the state’s/the nation’s interests, etc. 

But, remember, these incumbents will have already claimed that immigration reform is important and, arguably, faithful to their states’/the nation’s interests.  In a nutshell, the worries for the Democrats right now about immigration reform are actually focused on those Democratic Senators facing reelection in 2016.  If these members can’t stand the prospect of being seen as overly partisan (or, perhaps, as a flip-flopper), then the GOP can easily count on being able to get enough Democrat cross-overs to reach 60 votes if they control the Senate’s agenda through holding a majority of its seats in the 114th Congress.

Finally, Boehner and the House Republicans are probably thinking about exactly this possibility, given the meaningful possibility that the GOP might win control of the Senate in 2014.  Accordingly, in conjunction with the apparent security of their majority in the House, the House Republicans have little to no incentive to consider any immigration bill this Congress, precisely because the Senate Democrats passed one this Congress.  Finally, note that many Senate Republicans also voted for the immigration bill, which merely strengthens the argument.

With that, I leave you with this.

A Byrd in the Hand, or the 3 R’s of the Senate: Reid, Rules, & Retribution

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Forceful confrontation to a threat to filibuster is undoubtedly the antidote to the malady.
–Sen. Robert Byrd (D, WV)

Filibuster reform in the US Senate has once again begun to attract attention.  In a nutshell, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D, NV) is—ahem—upset that—in his opinion, at least—Republican Senators are unreasonably holding up executive branch nominations out of either animus towards the Obama Administration, hostility to the missions of the government agencies in question, or both.  As a result, Reid is contemplating “the nuclear option,” in which the Democrats and Vice President Joe Biden, as President of the Senate, would use the essentially majoritarian character of the Senate’s rules to clarify that the Senate is—particularly when a majority is ticked off—an essentially majoritarian body in which 51 votes wins.

Senate Republicans, who hold a minority of seats, are understandably upset about the possibility of “the bomb being dropped” and are threatening retribution if Reid goes nuclear.  I will not describe the procedural details of the nuclear option, which are easily found for those who, like me, enjoy parliamentary skullduggery. Instead, I will focus on the “mathofpolitics” of Reid’s situation.

Let’s set up the problem in a succinct fashion.  Going nuclear, Reid and the Senate Democrats can at least ensure an up or down on nominees.  While it isn’t clear (feel encouraged to clarify this for/update me in the comments or “offline/online” by emailing me)  exactly how “big” of a nuclear bomb Reid will/can drop in the sense of whether it would guarantee votes on all executive nominations, including judicial, or just those to executive agencies (or some other subset), I’ll keep it simple and just presume it’ll apply to all nominations, but not legislation.

Presumably, being able to get a timely up or down vote on nominations will be good for Reid and the Democrats right now, because President Obama is a Democrat.  So, there’s the easiest argument for why Reid should “go nuclear.”

However, there are at least two frequently forwarded arguments for why Reid should not go nuclear: the “scorched earth” argument and the “uncertain majority” argument.  The scorched earth argument goes as follows: if Reid goes nuclear and ensures votes on nominations, then Senate Republicans will find new ways to halt business, and retaliate by slowing the Senate down even more.  The uncertain majority argument, on the other hand, points out that the Democrats will not hold the majority forever, and their procedural victory will eventually get used against their interests by a subsequent Republican majority. I’ll consider these arguments in turn, and then summarize a “third way” that Reid might go.

As Ezra Klein points out, the scorched earth argument is (arguably, at least right now) less powerful than one might presume.  In a nutshell, this is because one might argue that the Republicans are currently “blocking everything” anyway.  (This is shorthand—as Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R, KY) and others have pointed out, the Senate Republicans are not blocking everything, or even all nominations.)  Accordingly, from a game theoretic perspective, one might argue that this argument should not have much impact on the Democrats’ decision to go nuclear or not.  Indeed, it suggests a rationale for why Reid and the Democrats should at least threaten to go nuclear: if the Republicans recognize that the scorched earth argument does not have much pull on the Democrats, then they will take such a threat more seriously and, to the degree Republicans do not want the nuclear option used, they will have an incentive to offer concessions to avoid its use.  (See the great series of posts essentially about this dynamic by Jonathan Bernstein and Sarah Binder, (here’s Bernstein’s response, and Binder’s response).)

Perhaps as a result of the limitations of the scorched argument in the current stand-off, the uncertain majority argument has been quickly brought forward by Senate Republicans.  Indeed, while the scorched earth argument has been publicly forwarded, too, it has essentially been quickly replaced/backed up by the uncertain majority argument. For this reason, as well as the fact that the excellent exchange between Bernstein & Binder essentially focuses on the likelihood/credibility of the scorched earth response, I will move on to the uncertain majority argument.

First, the uncertain majority argument is not dispositive. (Note that the scorched earth argument, to the degree that the minority can credibly implement it, is potentially dispositive in the sense of its irony: vote to speed things up and instead slow things down.)  This is because a bird in the hand is arguably better than two in the bush.  Reid’s experience with the Senate Republicans may have shown him that there may not even be one “in the bush.”  The real worry here is that, to the degree that Reid and the Democrats are actually tempted by the nuclear option, the GOP will presumably also be tempted by it when it gains the majority.

Let’s think about this for a second.  Thinking about the strategic situation in a little offers some insight into the relevant factors all Senators should be thinking about.

Suppose first that the nuclear option is “popular” in the sense that the public will approve (or at least not disapprove) of its use.  Well, in this case, the majority party should realize that, if they go nuclear, then—ceteris paribus—they are more likely to retain the majority.  More subtly, if we presume that this popularity is likely to hold into the near future, the majority should realize that if the minority party gains the majority in the near future, the new majority party will face a similar situation and, accordingly, the current minority party is likely to go nuclear at that point.  Both scenarios suggest that the Democrats should go nuclear: it would be popular and the minority party would do it if they gain the majority in the future.

So, under what conditions would the nuclear option not be a good choice?  Well, it boils down to two questions:

  1. Would “going nuclear” be unpopular/electorally costly? (Republican Senators are arguing that it would be.  Extra credit: given that we have a two-party system, why should one be at least a little skeptical of this statement?)
  2. If one does not go nuclear now, will “going nuclear” be popular in the future?

The first question is more pressing than the second, if only because of “bird in the hand” reasoning.  I don’t know the answer, and it’s not clear to me that anyone does, because I don’t think voters care, per se, about this procedural move: they want the Senate to “play by the rules” and “get things done” (i.e. the “cake and have it too” syndrome).  What is clear to me, however, is that Reid’s actions will frame the issue and at least partially determine the popularity of “going nuclear.”  I return to this below to conclude the post but, in a nutshell, I think this dimension is what will ultimately prevent the Democrats from going nuclear and, to be clear, I think part of that is Reid’s fault (but maybe by design).

The second question—will going nuclear be popular in the future—is truly secondary for now, but this will potentially be less true in 2016, should the Democrats hold on to the Senate majority in 2014.  This is because President Obama is a Democrat, and the Republicans’ promised uses of a “51-vote Senate” (e.g., read to the end of this) include using “their majority control to jam through a repeal of the Affordable Care Act, a repeal of the Wall Street Reform Act and other GOP priorities.”  Indeed, Sen. Lamar Alexander (R, TN) “said the GOP conference could pass with a simple majority vote legislation to weaken unions, authorization to complete the Keystone XL oil sands pipeline and other items.”

Because neither party controls two-thirds of either chamber, I have a strong suspicion that neither “a repeal of the Affordable Care Act” nor “a repeal of the Wall Street Reform Act” will actually occur before January 2017: I just can’t see President Obama signing such bills (in fact, I kind of doubt that the GOP would pass such bills even if they had the numbers).

So, I think the primary question for Senate Democrats is how electorally costly going nuclear would be.  As I alluded to above, I think going nuclear would give the GOP a useful mobilizer for the 2014 midterm elections.  Right now, the GOP doesn’t have much of “an issue” to run on in my opinion (neither do the Democrats).  “Breaking the rules to ram through executive appointments” particularly against the backdrop of the AP wiretaps/PRISM/IRS/Benghazi scandals (not to mention the for-now-arcane recess appointments dustup), might have a lot of traction with swing voters.

Reid’s actions at this point are key.  For all of the parliamentary Dr. Strangelove’s out there, this is how I would go nuclear if I were Reid.  (I’m not the first by any means to make this argument, but sometimes it’s good to repeat things that seem to make sense.)

Reid should force the GOP to take the floor.  He should essentially set aside the “tracking system” in which the Senate moves from item-to-item in a parallel fashion.  He has said the GOP is being obstructionist.  Instead of trying to invoke cloture on the nomination of (say) Gina McCarthy (currently awaiting confirmation as administrator of the EPA), Reid should bring McCarty’s confirmation up for debate, and not let the Senate move on until a vote is taken.  MAKE THE GOP FILIBUSTER/OBSTRUCT IN PUBLIC. 

In equilibrium, voters should not believe Reid’s claims that the GOP is obstructing business.  We as the electorate could, I suppose, crack open the Congressional Record and try to discern the counterfactuals but (1) that is actually pretty hard to do in a sensible way—if obstruction is unpopular (which it essentially must be if going nuclear will be electorally popular), then obstructionists have an incentive to obfuscate their obstructionism (say that 3 times fast), and (2) as Anthony Downs famously made clear, we not only aren’t going to, it isn’t even clear that it would be rational for us to take the time to do so.  No…if overcoming obstructionism is a big deal, Reid and the Democrats need to sit down and send the costly signal of its importance to the public by (ironically) forcing the GOP to obstruct in a visible fashion.  I don’t think Reid is going to do this, and maybe that’s the right decision, given the facts, but if he doesn’t do this, I don’t think he’ll go nuclear.  Senate rules are kind of like an A-Team episode: sure, there’s a lot of fights, but nobody ever dies.

With that, I continue a theme and leave you with this.